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This paper is an attempt to place in perspective the ideologies which have helped
shape South African Indian politics.
The history of organized Indian politics from the 1880s to the 1940s is mainly the
history of trader politics - an almost unbroken line of accommodation to the demands
of the ruling white minority; or, at most, selective reformism. This line has twice been
breached though. Between 1907 and 1913, and again in the 1940s, a radical leadership
emerged in the Transvaal and Natal which attempted to transform Indian politics. The
process of transformation began at the level of ideology. Thus the two periods of rad-
icalism are useful focal points: they demand an examination of not only the new ideol-
ogies, but also the old.
No attempt is made here to discuss the course of the passive resistance movements
which were the end result of Indian radicalism, except insofar as is necessary to explore
some of the issues which this paper has sought to address: the articulation of trader and
radical ideologies; the potential of radical ideologies to forge cross-class or, indeed cross-
race alliances; the extent to which that potential was realized, and the role of the Indian
lower middle classes in that realization.
The paper begins, however, with a discussion of Indian social stratification at the
turn of the century, and in the 1940s. This is meant, first of all, to provide the back-
ground to an understanding of the nature of the essentially conservative, entrenched
political parties which the radicals attempted to transform. The discussion also illu-
minates the conditions under which radicalism emerged. Finally it sketches the social
and economic conditions of the mass of the Indian people in order to identify their
specific interests. The varying extent to which, and the way in which, those interests
were represented by Indian politics at different times is in itself a significant comm-
entary on changes in the content of their ideological underpinning.
INDIAN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
By the turn of the century three broad strata were discernible within the Indian
population. Dominating the social and economic hierarchy was a trader elite. Some
1800 in total, they were based mainly in Natal - home of the vast majority of South
African Indians - but there were several hundreds in the Transvaal. Most of them had
migrated on their own initiative in the decades between the 1870s and 1890s; most of
them were from western India (mainly Gujerat), and many of them were members of
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heterodox Muslim sects.1
The elite created and nurtured many social and religious organizations which cel-
ebrated narrow cultural distinctions imported from India. In Natal these included the
Anjuman Islam, the Memon Committee, the Brahman Mandal and the Kathiawar Arya
Mandal. In the Transvaal, identifiable sub-groupings, though some were perhaps less
formally constituted, included the Gujerati Kunbis, the Konkanis, the Gujerat Hindu
Society, the Sanatan Veda Dharma Sabha, the Hamidia Islamic Society and the
Hamdarde Islamic Society. But these narrow loyalties were in part counterbalanced
by the fact that Muslims in both areas supported the international Red Crescent Society
and, for a time between 1905 and 1908, committees which were established in
Johannesburg and Durban to collect funds for a 'Holy Railway' from Damascus to
Medina. Even the far more fundamental distinction between Hindus and Muslims was
counterbalanced by an elite consciousness - however ill-defined - of themselves as an
Indian elite. There is an abundance of evidence to suggest that their most extravagant
secular social activities were attended by all of the group; and though they may occa-
sionally have included guests of honour of other races, these were essentially Indian
celebrations.2
But although these ascriptive similarities/differences were important in moulding the
social life of the traders, it was above all their common and, indeed, shared economic in-
terests which as early as the 1880s bound them together as a self-conscious elite. Their
interests in Natal and the Transvaal were closely intertwined through a network of part-
nerships (often involving family members), through credit networks which linked the
petty traders to big traders, and through the fact that in Natal the more affluent often
owned the property where smaller traders rented shops. This economic relationship,
which defined the elite both objectively and subjectively, shaped the ideology and the
political parties which the radicals sought to transform. These will be discussed in the
second part of the paper.3
By the turn of the century, a new Indian elite was beginning to emerge as an ob-
jectively definable group in Natal. By 1910 the perimeters of the group were clearly
distinguishable, though the group itself still showed signs of groping towards a self-
conscious sense of identity. In the main they were 'colonials' - the more materially
successful of the young, Natal-born offspring of indentured or ex-indentured labourers.
They numbered around 300 in 1904.
Part of what prevented this group from coalescing earlier was the fact that in terms
of ethnicity and religious affiliation they were somewhat less homogeneous than the
established commerical elite. Although the overwhelming majority were Tamil-speaking
Hindus, important members of the group were Tamil Christians (whose mother tongue
was English), and others among them were Telegu Hindus or Christians, or Hindi speak-
ers from northern India. Like the commerical elite, their early social organizations re-
flected these ascriptive attributes: the most important were the Hindu Young Men's
Association (whose language of business was Tamil), and the Young Men's Catholic
Society. Unlike the traders, however, the emerging elite lacked any overarching associa-
tion before 1909.
But more importantly, perhaps, it was the lack of a clearcut community of eco-
nomic interests which hampered the development of a unifying ideology by the emerg-
ing elite. What the group had in common was little more than a western education, and a
relatively superior position in the occupational structure: relative, that is, to the mass of
the Indian population from which they had risen. The most successful members of the
group were a few highly trained professionals: lawyers, civil servants, accountants and a
lone newspaper publisher. Lower down the occupational ladder were teachers, book-
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keepers, clerks interpreters, petty entrepreneurs and small farmers. Most of the emerg-
ing elite, though, were salaried white-collar workers, dependent for a livelihood on the
colonial administration. Their salaries obviously varied, but it seems accurate to suggest
that until around 1909, most were economically comfortable, if not wealthy.
It is not surprising, then, to find that the new elite began to cohere as a distinct, self-
conscious group during the postwar depression in Natal when it became increasingly
difficult for western educated white-collar workers to maintain existing standards, far
less aspire realistically to anything higher. The ideological form which they found to
express their sense of common identity - South Africanism - linked them downwards to
the mass of the people and produced the crucial challenge to both trader ideology, and
radical ideology, which changed the shape of the first passive resistance movement.
This too will be discussed in the second part of the paper.4
The final broad stratum in the Indian population, referred to thus far - rather un-
helpfully - as the mass of the people, needs to be disagregated even for a brief sketch of
their social and economic conditions. The most crucial distinction within this stratum
was that between indentured workers and others.
The base of the South African Indian population was built on the flow of inden-
tured labour which began in 1860. Between 1860 and 1911, when the importation of
Indian labourers ceased at the request of the Union government, 152,184 workers were
shipped to Natal - approximately one third out of Calcutta, and the rest out of Madras.
The sugar Industry in Natal was built on this cheap labour: indentured Indians formed
the backbone of the coastal sugar plantations during the industry's infancy. Indian con-
tract labour was the mainstay of up-country farms and wattle plantations. Increasingly
after the 1890s indentured Indians were also used in the industrial sector, principally on
the Natal Government Railway (NGR) and the northern coalfields. They were also
valued as domestic servants in private residences, hotels, restaurants, boarding schools
and hospitals. However, indentured Indians in Natal were primarily agricultural labour-
ers. The agricultural sector rarely absorbed less than 75% of the total indentured work-
force, which numbered around 30,000 towards the end of the first decade of the
century.5
Some 48% of these migrant labourers stayed on in Natal after their term of inden-
ture had expired. From there, several thousands drifted north to the Transvaal before
the Anglo-Boer war; but most of them remained in Natal.6 Initially they and their
descendants enjoyed modest material success: there were numerous opportunities for
involvement in petty enterprises in the agricultural sector which required little or no
capital investment.7 During the postwar depression in Natal, however, they began to
experience severe economic pressure. In addition to the depressed economy they bore
the burden of an annual £3 tax to which those who had entered indenture after 1895,
and their offspring, were subject. Widespread unemployment and destitution, and
heavy indebtedness, are reported in a variety of sources between 1905 and 1908. The
NGR and the surgar plantations lowered their wage levels for free Indian labour, so that
even those who were employed experienced unusual pressures.8 One possible avenue
of escape, the Rand gold mines, which had attracted Indian wage workers before the
Anglo-Boer war, was blocked <Sff after the British administration in the Transvaal started
clamping down on Indian immigration in 1903 and 1904. The pre-war opportunities
for Indian hawkers in the Transvaal were, of course, similarly restricted. Increasingly,
then, the ex-indentured were driven back into contract work, where payment of the tax
was suspended as long as the worker remained under contract. A measure of how hard
this community was hit by the cumulative pressures of the £3 tax and the depressed
economy is the fact that in 1913, some four years after the beginning of economic
Ideology in Organized Indian Politics
recovery, 65.25% of the entire indentured workforce was under second, or subsequent,
terms of indenture. Most of these were on the sugar plantations.9
Conditions for the indentured workforce into which these ex-indentured workers
were thrown back obviously varied from employer to employer.1 ° But a close reading
of the Protector of Indian Immigrants* files suggests a number of valid generalizations.
In theory the labourer's conditions of existence were dictated by the terms of his five
year contract, which conformed to Government of India regulations, and which offered
an adquate, if very meagre, level of subsistence. The terms of contract were, however,
all too often abused - particularly in the agricultural sector where some 75% of Indian
contract workers were employed. Indeed, there is a solid weight of evidence in the
Protector's files to suggest that overwork (as much as a 17 or 18 hour day in the over-
lapping crushing and planting seasons), malnourishment, and squalid, degrading living
conditions formed the pattern of daily life throughout much of the agricultural sector.
According to medical officials of the time, these conditions were significant contributing
factors in the abnormally high disease and death rates of the indentured workforce.
Although the material conditions of industrial indentured labourers were slightly less
oppressive, it is clear that the vast majority of indentured workers led a harsh, if not sub-
minimal existence. Elaborate layers of formal and informal controls were used to keep
workers on the job under these conditions. The degree of control varied with the harsh-
ness of conditions, ranging from employer/official encouragement or sanctioning of
palliatives (drug and alcohol abuse, gambling and money-lending, for instance), to
sjambok-wielding gang bosses, and a legal system that was heavily stacked in favour of
employers. 'Leaving the estate in a body' was illegal, and punishable by fines or jail
sentences even if the labourers had left to complain about breach of contract, and even
if that complaint were upheld by the magistrate or Protector. Indeed, no indentured
Indian could move more than 2 miles beyond his place of work without a written ticket
of leave. Thus the workforce was atomized by law. If, despite all this, a worker did
show signs of political awareness, such as trying to organize others in his compound, or
even his work gang, he was immediately transferred elsewhere - the final divisive mech-
anism.
Given these constraints on worker action, it is difficult to assess the degree of work-
er consciousness shared by indentured labourers. Obviously they protested their con-
ditions; but, not surprisingly, these protests were usually individualistic, and often of a
type which did not require premeditation - malingering, absenteeism, destruction of em-
ployer property, and desertion, for instance. But, taking the period from 1860 to a-
bout 1909 as a whole, the incidence of collective action is - again, not surprisingly - low.
There were no more than a handful of strikes, and these were short-lived, rarely tran-
scended the accommodation units or work gangs into which plantation, mine or railway
workforces were further subdivided, and were generally concerned with specific gross
abuses of the contract. But as the percentage of re-indentured labourers in the work-
force began to rise sharply after 1906, collective action and, even more, individual acts
of protest, began to increase. Thus it is abundantly clear that, at least as individuals, in-
dentured workers had a profound sense of grievance about their living and working con-
ditions. Indeed, the growing air of militancy, as more and more ex-indentured workers
joined the ranks of the indentured, suggests - among some at least - a broader conscious-
ness: if nothing else, a sense of a wider range of options than would usually have been
perceived by new recruits from India.
What is particularly important for present purposes then, is to underscore both the
more pressing grievances of indentured and ex-indentured workers, and tlieir inability to
effectively represent these grievances. No cohesive formal political protest was generat-
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ed by the mass of the people themselves, fragmented as they were into free rural and ur-
ban wage labourers, petty cultivators, hawkers, pedlars, and an atomized indentured
workforce. But nor, contrary to the rhetoric of trader politics, were their grievances
represented by the commercial elite, unless representing them could be seen to serve
elite interests in some way. Indeed, the only real linkages between the commerical elite
and the mass of the people were the essentially exploitative patron-client relationships
formed by money lenders, shopkeepers, and the owner-operators of the Durban produce
market. Thus, as the emerging new elite in Natal began to develop a unifying ideology,
and to create a separate political identity, the field was clear for them to claim this vast
potential constituency.
• Whatever attempts were made to mobilize the mass of the Indian people for political
action in the early years of the century proved to be short-lived. By the 1940s they
were still poorly served by organized Indian politics, and they still suffered oppressive
social and economic conditions. Recruitment for indentured labour in India had
stopped in 1911: the last contracts were being worked out by 1916. The £3 annual
tax on ex-indentured workers had been abolished in 1914. But opportunities for ex-
indentured and their descendants to earn an independent livelihood in the agricultural
sector had steadily declined between the wars, particularly during the 1929 - 1932
depression. Evictions by landowners, extending their own operations in the rural areas,
and by the Durban City Council as industrialization advanced through the peri-urban
areas, pushed others off the land. The 1936 Sugar Agreement, meant to protect small
white cane farmers from the growing monopoly of large estates, climated numbers of
petty Indian cultivators who could not meet the quotas set by the Agreement. By the
census year 1946, only 15.4% (12,008) of the total male Indian working population re-
mained on the land - virtually all of these, as at the turn of the century, in Natal. Near-
ly half of this number were wage workers, mainly in the sugar industry which was noted
by contemporary observers as one of the lowest paying employers of Indian labour. Of
the rest, only a small proportion owned their land, most of them holding monthly or
yearly leases with no security of tenure. Contemporary studies describe their lifestyle
as hand to mouth at best. Families were large, and laregly illiterate; they lived in
shanties which lacked sanitation, lighting and adequate water supplies. Intestinal
diseases were rife.1!
Part cause,12 and part effect of the shrinking rural Indian community was the rapid
growth of the Indian urban v/age labour force. Between 1936 and 1946 it soared from
approximately 30% to 53% of the total male Indian working population. Some 88% of
these (around 36,000) were in Natal, mainly Durban.13 It is difficult to assess to v/hat
extent these newly urbanised workers developed some sense of worker consciousness,
and to what extent they might have maintained their links with, and continued to
identify with, the rural areas which they had so recently left. More than one source
suggests that the move to the towns consisted less of complete families than of young
males whom family smallholdings could no longer support and for whom, clearly, finan-
cial constraints made the acquisition of their own land impossible. In earlier decades,
the strength of the Indian joint family system would have ensured close links between
town and countryside under these circumstances. But, at least within the urban areas,
the joint family was rapidly disintegrating during the war. The disintegrate force
seems to have been generated inside the families, by the young, and particularly by
young women. It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that though a residual sense of
obligation might have kept the newly urbanized in touch with the rural areas, the link-
ages would not have been sufficiently strong for them to continue to identify closely
with them.14
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The rapid growth of Indian trade unionism in the 1930s and 1940s is also suggestive
of old loyalties and old forms of consciousness being replaced by new, however tent-
atively the replacements might initially have been formulated. Indian unions which,
like African unions in secondary industry, began to flourish in 1928 in the wake of the
Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) and the Wage Act (1925), claimed 22,000 members
by 1948. *s In the early years of the war, the unions were instrumental in helping to
improve wage rates for Indian workers, at least to the extent of securing Wage Board
investigations of their conditions, or ensuring that Wage Board Determinations were
actually implemented by employers. Indeed, at first sight the success of organized
labour appears quite striking: in numbers of industries Indian wage rates doubled or
even tripled between 1937 and 1946. Bui it.is is a measure mainly of the rate of infla-
tion and of how low Indian wages were in the mid 1930s. In any event, hemmed in by
the 'civilized labour' policy, and by grossly inadequate educational facilities, the major-
ity of the Indian workforce remained unskilled labourers, at the lowest levels of the
wage spectrum. Real improvements in their conditions of existence - if, indeed, there
were any during this decade - were minimal.16
Numbers of surveys conducted in the 1940s reached the same basic conclusion: 'not
only is malnutrition serious among the Indian community in Durban, but also . . . for
large numbers the quantity of food is insufficient'. This, despite between 65% and 70%
of income spent on food.1 7 The corollary of the sudden upsurge in the urban popula-
tion, relatively low wages, and high expenditure on foods, was housing conditions which
were consistently condemned by contemporary reports. One of these is particularly
revealing:
A large proportion of the Durban Indian community is housed in
shacks and other poorly constructed dwellings which are scattered
over the undeveloped agricultural lands along the western bound-
aries of the City. Some of these are actually cultivators, but by far
the larger number have leased a patch of land, usually about half an
acre in extent, and have erected on it one of the poorest types of
dwelling imaginable. Old tar drums, relics of corrugated iron, and
old pieces of wood are pressed into the construction, which with its
earth floor and smoke grimed walls offers more suitable accommoda-
tion for the cockroaches and other vermin who share the uneasy
symbiosism. The water supply for these shacks is drawn from
springs and streams which are frequently highly polluted, and
commonly nothing but the most primitive methods of stercus dispo-
sal are attempted.
This report was written in 1940.18 By the mid 1940s, these problems were exac-
erbated by severe overcrowding and escalating rents, which will be discussed more
fully shortly.
The extensive surveys conducted by the University of Natal Department of Econom-
ics, and by others, are lacking for the Transvaal. But the files of the Johannesburg
Indian Social Welfare Association are rich with detail which leaves no doubt that the
conditions of existence of the small Transvaal Indian wage labour force were little
different than those of the Natal Indians. They suffered the same low wage rates. They
lived in urban slums which, like those in Natal, were consistently condemned by
contemporary investigators.1 9
Wartime inflation and the tiglitening noose of restrictive legislation had also made its
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impact on the Indian elites by the 1940s. The more successful among the commercial
elite in both Natal and the Transvaal (still mainly descendants of the Gujerati imm-
igrants of the late 19th century) had continued to flourish, at least in terms of capital
accumulation. Much of this they invested in property in Natal and the Transvaal, as
they had been doing for decades. Between 1932 and 1946 millions of pounds worth of
property was bought by Indians in the Transvaal. Between 1927 and 1940 the rateable
value of Indian properties an the Old Borough of Durban increased from £1,441,210 to
£3,448,230. In the 'added areas' of Durban - site of the urban slums described above -
they increased from £1,736,910 in 1934 to £2,394,300 in 1940. Some of these prop-
erties, particularly in the Old Borough, in the more affluent hitherto 'European* suburbs
(as they were called at the time), reflected the wealthy Indians' dissatisfaction with the
slum or near-slum conditions in the predominantly Indian areas of Durban. At least
70% of the new properties, however, seem to have been acquired strictly for investment
purposes: though owned by Indians they were not occupied by them. The 1942 and
1943 Broome Commissions noted that Natal and Transvaal Indian capital had only two
investment outlets - commerce and immovable property. But trade expansion was re-
stricted by the licensing laws in both provinces (particularly rigorously in the Transvaal
after 1939), and Indian occupation of land or immovable property not previously occ-
upied by Indians was temporarily prohibited in the Transvaal in 1939. In the face of
these cumulative threats, the Natal property market v/as an increasingly important in-
vestment outlet for the commercial elite of both provinces after 1939.2 °
But Natal was not slow to follow the Transvaal. The 1943 'Pegging Act*21 closed
off the elite's only remaining major avenue of investment by prohibiting the transfer of
property from whites to Indians in the the municipality of Durban for the next three
years. As a result of these new restrictions, property prices and rents soared in the pre-
dominantly Indian areas of Johannesburg and Durban. These already crowded slums
and near slums swiftly became severely overcrowded under the combined impact of
natural population increase, the impossibility of movement elsewhere and, in the case of
Natal, continued migration from the countryside. In Johannesburg, and doubtless also
Durban, hndlords charged exorbitant 'key money* or 'goodwill* for the right to rent a
single dilapidated room. Workers' conditions under these circumstances have already
been describsid. To an extent these conditions were also suffered by petty traders and
white collar workers who, though they numbered among the Indian notables for social
and political purposes, did not have the economic resources which had enabled the more
affluent members of the elites to buy their way into more congenial surroundings. In-
deed, Indian white collar workers had been hard hit by the 'civilized labour* policy,
while petty traders suffered the insecurity of knowing that their small business would be
the first to collapse if segregation were permanently enforced. In the meantime they
found themselves trapped with the wage workers in the rapidly deteriorating predom-
inantly Indian areas of Johannesburg or Durban. Though they were not confined to the
makeshift shanties of the wage labourers, contemporary observers nevertheless noted the
overcrowding and squalor of their surroundings.2 2
By the mid 1940s, then, the single most pressing problem for the majority of the
Natal and Transvaal Indians was the effect of the new ligislation which confined them to
specific areas of Durban and Johannesburg. This legislation was temporary, but new
laws were being worked out which promised to be at least as restrictive, threatening not
only to confine Indians to specific areas, but possibly also to expropriate their holdings
in other areas. What is important for present purposes, though, is to re-emphasize the
different ways in which these restrictions weighed on different strata of the community.
For the wealthier members of the elites the proposed legislation threatened loss of their
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major investment outlets - choice urban property, either as an investment in itself, or
for commercial expansion; and, more importantly, possible loss of their vast vested
interests. For the less affluent memebers of the elites, urban segregation meant almost
certain loss of livelihood for some; or, at best, sharing the increasing squalor of increas-
ingly working class neighbourhoods - a privation which they felt keenly. For the work-
ers themselves, segregation threatened homelessness, either through the inability to
stretch their already overstrained incomes to meet escalating rents, or through slum
clearance. But at the same time, it held the possiblity of being rehoused in new muni-
cipal housing schemes which some workers, at least, favoured.
INDIAN POLITICS
From the first formal Indian political campaign in 1891, until the 1940s, Indian
politics were dominated by the Natal and Transvaal commercial elite. Their major
politcal organizations - the Durban-based Indian Committee (founded c. 1890), the
Natal Indian Congress (1894), the Transvaal British Indian Association (1904 - name
changed to Transvaal Indian Congress in 1926) and the South African Indian Congress
(1919) - were founded to protect vested commercial interests, and controlled by the
wealthiest merchants.2 3
It is unnecessary to give any detail of these politics here. What is needed is only to
draw out a few key points. Although these parties claimed to be the representatives of
the entire Indian community - and were recognized as such by successive South African,
British and Indian governments - membership consisted overwhelmingly of the commer-
cial elite. Despite elaborate organizational structures and procedures in most parties,
they in fact functioned only intermittently, and usually without regard to their own
rules and regulations. Mobilization of the membership for political action was success-
fully effected only when new, or proposed legislation was perceived to pose a serious
threat to actual or potential trader interests. Indeed, mobilization was attempted only
under these circumstances. Political action, except in the periods of radicalism which
will be discussed shortly, consisted of constitutional protest: letters, petitions and
deputations to key officials in South Africa, Britain or India. These forms of protest
were generally extra-parliamentary since South African Indians were not enfranchised.
The ideology which informed trader politics changed little during this half century.
Although formal ideological statements from the trader were rare, clearly definable
ideological assumptions are implicit as well as explicit in the pattern of their politics and
political discourse. Insofar as the traders had an articulate secular ideology, it was fairly
typical of that of any merchant class, and certainly typical of the Gujerati trading
communities (whether Hindu or Muslim) from which they had migrated. Maximum
emphasis was placed on protecting their privileged economic position. Socially and
politically they were conservative. They worked within the framework of the existing
social order, and although they protested manifestations of the whites' discrimination
against Indians, they protested from a class rather than a national or racial position. In-
deed, the first few decades of trader political rhetoric is shot through with references to
the distinction between themselves and the mass of the South African Indian people.
They not only accepted the inequalities between traders and indentured or ex-
indentured workers, but legitimized them by offsetting the commerical elite as the
'respectable' members of the community. There is no doubt that this strand in their
ideology was brought with them from India: caste/class distinctions were an integral
part of 19th century Indian cultural baggage, whether Hindu or Muslim. But these
sorts of distinctions were strongly reinforced in South Africa. This was particularly so
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in late 19th century Natal, where the traders perceived the major threat to their eco-
nomic interests to derive from being identified as members of a race which was placed
low in the colonial racial hierarchy, and for whose vast majority restrictive legislation al-
ready existed. But at the same time as they opposed racial discrimination which affect-
ed - or might affect - them, they shared the whites' prejudices against blacks. These pre-
judices v/ere also, almost certainly, imported from India, where hereditary hierarchical
social divisions were largely congruent with skin colour. But, again, they were strongly
reinforced in South Africa. En the late !9th century Transvaal in particular, the traders
feared that justification for discriminatory legislation would be derived from their being
identified simply as non-whites (kleurling\ for most of whom restrictive legislation al-
ready existed. Trader ideology, then, was a complex web of class and race prejudices
rooted both in the Indian traditions of their communities, and in the specific circum-
stances of their existence in late 19th - early 20th century Natal and the Transvaal. But
there was nothing irrational or arbitrary about these prejudices or the politics which
they helped shape. They were meant to protect - in South Africa, as they did in India -
the traders' privileged economic position,24
INDIAN RADICALISM
These political tactics and this ideology were first challenged by Mohandas Gandhi.
Gandhi had been hired as a legal representative and political organizer by some of the
wealthiest Natal-based Indian merchants in 1894. For more than a decade, based first
in Durban, then Johannesburg, Gandhi planned and co-ordinated the activities of the
Natal Indian Congress and Transvaal British Indian Association, which he had helped
found. Ths, political patterns and ideology which had been established by the pre-
Gandhian Indian Committee remained virtually unchanged during this time. In Septem-"
ber 1906 Gandhi attempted to radicalize trader politics by calling for passive resistance
against the Transvaal government. This was the beginning of a crisis-ridden campaign
that lasted off and on (more the former than the latter) for over seven years.2 5
The development in Gandhi's personal philosophy which underpinned this attempt
to impose radicalism from above need not be discussed. What is of interest here is the
ideology of the movement; its potential; the extent to which that potential was realiz-
ed, and the subtle changes of ideological flavour which accompanied tactical shifts to
accommodate planned and unplanned changes in the the movement's social base.
At its most pure and basic level Gandhian passive resistance, or satyagraha as it came
to be called, was a set of beliefs which contained within them both a simple existential
truth, and a command for both private and public action. Satyagraha presupposed
moral autonomy. It rested on the assumption that man must be a free and independent
moral agent, master of his own destiny rather than the passive object of someone else's
will. But at the same time Gandhi accepted the legitimacy of the state and of the broad
outlines of the existing pattern of social relations, and the need for an external structure
of authority. Indeed, implicit within his writings and activity of this period is the be-
lief that social oppression - or its opposite - derived simply from the will of the govern-
ment. Thus the revolutionary potential of one strand of his ideology was held in check
by a liberal, reformist strand which demanded only that men of conscience should
challenge manifest injustices in an otherwise acceptable body of law.
Even with these limitations, and even with the ideology offered only to the Indian
community, satyagraha clearly held enormous radical potential, implying cross-class
solidarity within the community. However, despite the universalist and humanist tone
of his philosophy, Gandhi's notion of community had yet to transcend Iiis peers, the
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commercial elite. He thus chose initially to work within, and for, existing Indian polit-
ical structures. The obvious political advantages to be derived from this were outweigh-
ed by equally obvious disadvantages: nothing in the history of trader ideology or pol-
itics suggested that the elite would respond to a moral call to action. Indeed Gandhi's
philosophy had been worked out in the context of his despair at what he saw as the
moral degradation of the Indian elite. The radical potential of satyagraha was thus
further whittled down to fit it to the needs and interests of the traders.
These compromises produced a movement whose initial goal was the repeal of a dis-
criminatory piece of legislation which demanded that all Transvaal Indians submit to
registration by the government. This goal was made relevant to the elite by convincing
them that it admitted the principle of racist I^talation for Indians, which would then be
used to enforce urban segregation at the expense of Natal and Transvaal Indian vested
interests. Given the Transvaal's history of attempts to confine Indians to designated
locations (and Natal's occasional stabs in the same direction), and given the Milner
administration's recent survey of proposed urban sites for Indians, the connection be-
tween these two propositions was far less tenuous than it might seem at first sight. This
logic allowed Gandhi to tap the very core of trader ideology, and the one issue which
had mobilized them in the past: protection of their vested interests. The two dominant
themes in the movement's ideology were thus the moral one - articulated as a confused
conception of national and individual honour - and a simple economic rationale.
Passive resistance began in mid 1907 with refusal, on pain of arrest, to take out
registration certificates by the specified date. The initial response was overwhelming.
The Transvaal notables used their credit, client, ethnic and religious networks to enforce
solidarity. The Natal notables were generous with both moral and financial support.
The first arrests caused a flutter of panic in the movement, but more rigorous manipula-
tion of horizontal and vertical linkages within the community steadied it again. In
early 1908, however, the movement's fatal weakness was exposed when the government
linked registration certificates to renewal of trading licenses. Suddenly the campaign
violated the cardinal principle of trader ideology and politics. This immediately broke
the back of trader support.
Loss of trader support allowed Gandhi to impose his personal ethnical preoccupa-
tions on the movement. They dominated its philosophy from 1908 onwards, replacing
'self-interest' with 'self-sacrifice'. The economic imperative was dropped from the
ideology, and it was shifted to a more purely ethical footing. The confused conception
of honour which had comprised the initial moral content of the ideology was clarified.
The movement now rested mainly on the pursuit of 'Truth' (right action against in-
justice by a fearless man of conscience); but the nationalist overtones of the first stage
of the campaign continued to flavour the ideology. Two new goals were added to the
original: preservation of the theoretical right of educated Indians to immigrate to the
Transvaal, and protection of the residence rights of all pre-war Indian residents. These
goals were in keeping with Gandhi's personal ethics, but since they were of no direct
relevance to his notional constituents, they added nothing to the movement's appeal.
On the contrary, they obviously made the original goal of the campaign harder to
achieve since it was now linked to two others.
Throughout 1908 and 1909 Gandhi and a handful of committed supporters (one or
two of them big traders) turned from one stratum to another of the Transvaal Indian
community in an effort to keep the movement going. Ideology, goals and tactics re-
mained the same, but the focal point of recruitment efforts changed. Attention was
focussed, increasingly unsuccessfully, on hawkers, petty traders, hawkers again, and
finally the big traders with whom the movement had been started. Gandhi also visited
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Durban in an usuccessful attempt to open a second front in Natal. But the movement
offered no tangible benefits. By the end of 1909 it had completely collapsed, except
for Gandhi and his handful of committed supporters, who continued to seek arrest
throughout 1910.
From late 1910 to late 1913, the 'movement' existed only at the level of negotiations
between Gandhi and the Union government. The fact that it existed at all is in part a
testament to Gandhi's commitment to his newly developed ethics: attainment of the
movement's goals had become a personal moral war for him. As important was his
ability to command the attention of the government. The barrage of carefully planned
publicity which the early stages of the campaign had received in India and Britain, and
the sensitive political situation in India, ensured continued imperial government interest
in a peaceful settlement. Indeed, it had been discussed with Smuts (who dealt with the
movement first as Transvaal Colonial Secretary, then as Union Minister of the Interior)
during the final round of Union negotiations in London in mid 1909. Smuts' interest
in a peaceful settlement, however, far exceeded sensitivity to the political situation in
India. The price he exacted from the imperial government for keeping open negotia-
tions with the passive resisters was an end to the flow of indentured Indians to Natal,
which he had sought since 1908. Once this price had been set, the goals of the move-
ment were included in the deliberations for the first Union-wide immigration bill which
began early in 1911.
Smuts attempted to simplify and minimize the South African Indian question by
treating Gandhi as the principal Indian spokesman on immigration, thus formally ex-
tending his influence to an all-South African level. But this assumed a degree of control
over Indian politics which Gandhi had never had. Paradoxically, it was the com-
promises which Gandhi was required to make in order to retain his legitimacy as princi-
pal Indian spokesman which finally led to a dramatic widening of the social base of the
movement, and the realization of the radical potential of satyagraha.
In March 1911, as the negotiations for the Immigration Bill began, the Natal new
elite formed a political party called the Colonial Born Indian Association (CBIA).
Hitherto, in the classic pattern of an upwardly mobile group, the ambitions of the
young, western educated Natal-born Indians had been expressed in an alliance with
those above them in their soical hierarchy, the traders. During the postwar depression,
though, when the upward mobility of the western educated received its first serious
check, it became clear that trader politics did not adequately represent their interests,
and were opposed to them in some instances. The process of differentiation which gave
birth to the new elite, and culminated in the creation of the CBIA was largely a response
to these pressures. The party marked the creation of a unifying ideology by the new
elite. The basis of their perceived unity, expressed in the name which they chose for
their organization, was their local origins. They saw themselves as South Africans who,
though they happened to be of Indian descent, could legitimately claim the rights and
privileges of South African citizens. More importantly, the party confirmed the new
elite's realignment of loyalties, away from the traders, and downwards to the mass of
the people from whom they had risen. The first meeting of the party made it clear
that its leaders included at least the upper levels of the masses in their perception of
themselves as South Africans. The chairman's opening speech singled out the iniquity
of the £3 annual tax on ex-indentured labourers, noting that their future constituents
would increasingly include Natal-born Indians who were subject to the tax.
The possibility that the CBIA might mobilize the mass of the people, radicalizing
Indian politics and endangering the uneasy coexistence which the traders had established
with the Natal government, was sufficient for the Congress to hastily include the aboli-
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tion of the tax in their own political platform. Gandhi, struggling to maintain his role
as notional spokesman for the South African Indians, equally switftly included it in his
political platform. More forceful representations against the tax by a new elite pressure
group in late 1911 and early 1912, saw the tax question elevated to the top of the
Gandhi-Congress list of South African Indian grievances. But the tax was not adopted
as a goal of the movement, whose original goals now seemed capable of being met by
negotiation. However, when a revered elder member of the Indian National Congress
(G.K. Gokhale) toured South Africa at Gandhi's invitation late that year, the tax was
among the South African Indian problems that he discussed with Union cabinet min-
isters. Gokhale carried away the impression that they had promised to repeal the tax.
Their refusal to do so was perceived by C:*""'W as a morally unacceptable 'breach of
faith'. This allowed him to adopt the tax as a goal of the movement in mid 1913, when
the long drawn out negotiations for the immigration bill had reached an apparently final
impasse.
On 16 October 1913, Gandhi and his committed supporters started a strike of
Indian workers on the Natal coalfields, for the repeal of the £3 tax. The immediate
success of the strike call was a testament not only to worker awareness of the burden
imposed by the tax in a low wage economy, but to the multiplicity of grievances in the
daily lives of indentured labourers. But the real success for Gandhi came when the
strike - unexpectedly and unintentionally - spread like a cane fire through the vast
brutally oppressed work force on the coastal sugar plantations, and from there to coastal
Indian workers in general. By the end of November when lack of resources and govern-
ment suppression had driven most of the strikers back to work, the strike had, at one
time or another, paralyzed the Durban and Pietermaritzburg produce market, closed
down some of the sugar mills, stripped many coastal hotels, restaurants and private res-
idences of their domestics, resulted in some 150 acres of cane being illegally burned, and
inconvenienced the coal industry, the Natal Government Railway, and other smaller in-
dustries in coastal Natal. The negotiated settlement for the seven year old campaign
came soon after this.
The road to radicalism in the 1940s, though similar in some key respects, was in the
main rather different. Although Usuf Dadoo emerged as a commanding figure, likened
to Gandhi by some, he was only one among numbers of South African Indians - mainly
in Natal - who began to challenge the politics accommodation in the mid or late 1930s.
Their backgrounds differed. Some were well qualified professionals, sons of wealthy
traders, who had been educated abroad. Others were workers with little formal educa-
tion. Many of them entered Indian politics via organizations with a wider perspective.
They were trade union officials and/or members of the CPSA or the Non European
United Front which was established in Cape Town in March 1938. NEUF was the prod-
uct of growing militancy among the coloured and black lower middle classes, one of
several abortive attempts in the 1930s to create a broad based movement capable of
mobilizing mass support from the blacks. These initiatives were assisted and encour-
aged by the CPSA which, with international communism in general, underwent a strate-
gic reorientation towards united front politics during this period. At NEUF's first
annual conference in April 1939, Dadoo and H.A. Naidoo - both of them CP members -
were elected to the national council, Dadoo representing Johannesburg, and Naidoo
Durban.2 6
The radical ideology which informed these politics was all encompassing, calling for
cross-class and cross-racial alliance in the formation of the broadest possible united front
against white minority rule in general and racial segregation in particular. The tactics
which were agreed on in 1939 were boycotts, active and passive resistance, strikes and
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demonstrations. Dadoo, however, entered South African Indian politics with an addi-
tional ideological frame of references. As a child in Krugersdorp he had attended discus-
sion groups held by former associations of Gandhi's which focussed both on the South
African Indian resistance movement of 1906 to 1913, and on the growing tide of nation-
alism in India in the 1920s. As a youth at college in northern India, and a young man
studying medicine in London and Edinburgh, he had become involved in local and over-
seas Indian nationalist politics.2 8 At least in the popular perception, these politics were
personified by the increasingly charismatic folk-hero figure of Gandhi in the 1920s and
1930s.
Both of these ideological strands underpinned Dadoo's attempts to radicalize Trans-
vaal Indian politics in 1939. The issue which he chose to address was the Asiatic
(Transvaal) Land and Trading Act which proiiibited the transfer of property from whites
to Indians for the next two years, pending the passage of more permanent legislation.
Dadoo called for passive resistance not only against the Act, but against 'any legislative
or other measures' whose objective was segregation.29
As Gandhi had done, Dadoo tried to work through the established political parties.
Former associates of Gandhi's and others who, like Dadoo, had an active interest in the
Indian nationalist movement, responded to the mainly nationalist appeal in the ideology
of the proposed campaign. The petty traders whose low profit margins rendered them
most vulnerable to segregation also pledged support. However the big traders who con-
trolled the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) remained unresponsive to this mixed appeal
to Indian national honour and non European unity. Taking their lead from the Trans-
vaal, the Natal and South African Indian Congresses also refused to support a campaign.
Radicalism had run afoul of the central principle of trader ideology and politics once
more. Although the traders obviously did not welcome segregation, they were prepared
to accept it since they seemed likely to gain, in exchange, security of tenure for the
millions of pounds worth of property which they had acquired in recent years. In the
event, however, Dadoo called off the proposed campaign in July, on the advice of
Gandhi who urged further negotiation with the government. The evidence does not
suggest, ir. anycase, that response to the campaign would have been widespread.30
This abortive attempt to impose radicalism from above was followed by a slow mov-
ing and more cautious attempt to transform the existing political parties from below.
In the Transvaal, Dadoo met big trader opposition by establishing a splinter group of
TIC which he named the nationalist bloc. In Natal the initial attempt to erode trader
power in organized politics took the form of a handful of Indian CP members encourag-
ing the creation of a new party, the Natal Indian Association. NIA emerged from the
amalgamation of the Natal Indian Congress and the Colonial Born and Settlers Indian
Association. The CBSIA, like its predecessor the CBIA, had a definite radical potential.
The party had been formed in 1933 by the Natal white collar elite during a moment of
perceived crisis when it seemed that trader politics were inimical to their interests. In-
deed, many of its officials had first challenged trader politics under similar circumstanc-
es as officials of the CBIA quarter of a century earlier. In 1933, as in 1911, the party's
manifesto claimed the rights and privileges of citizenship for its members on the basis
of their being South African. The manifesto also looked to the mass of the people for
the party's constituency.31 However, the presence of a handful of CPand NEUF mem-
bers on the executive of the newly created Natal Indian Association in 1939 marked the
first concerted attempt to realize this radical potential.32
The increasing interpenetration of the CP, organized Indian labour, and the Indian
political parties during the next six years simultaneously eroded big trader power in the
political parties and began to widen their social base. The traders however, struggled to
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retain control of organized politics. The cross-class, cross-race orientation of the new
Indian radicalism was thrown sharply into relief as Indian CP and NEUF members en-
gaged in anti-war work before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Dadoo
was jailed in September 1940 for publishing an anti-war 'appeal to all non-European
people of South Africa', which listed both general and particular instances of their
oppression.3 3 The traders fought back by accusing the radicals of using 'foreign ideolo-
gies' which endangered the 'Indian cause', and by co-opting the Gandhian and Indian
nationalist ideology which Dadoo had used in 1939, but which they had then reject-
ed.34 The ideological differences were translated into political reality at the level of
complete rejection of segregation by the radicals, and conditional acceptance by the big
traders, who were still prepared to negotiate in the hope of securing at least their vested
interests.35 At the same time, both sides sought to mobilize worker support (or, at
least, deny it to the other side) by representing the full range of workers'grievances.36
This struggle is most clearly demonstrated in the continuous process of amalgamation,
dissolution, and reamalgamation, that Natal Indian politics underwent between August
1939 and October 1945. The radicals, and their allies among the petty traders and
white collar workers who were already suffering the bite of segregation and other forms
of discrimination, formed political splinter groups when they were not able to effective-
ly influence policy making, and moved back into mainstream politics when they were.37
A similar, though less attenuated process, occurred in the Transvaal. By late 1945
the old, established political parties were dominated by radicals.38 In mid 1946 they
began a passive resistance campaign which lasted until 1948. The campaign demanded
the repeal of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act - the Ghetto Act as it
became known - which made permanent, and extended, the segregationist legislation of
the preceding seven years. However, the Act was portrayed simply as an instance of the
wider pattern of racial discrimination in South Africa, and it was this that the campaign
was directed against. There are thus striking parallels with Gandhi's passive resistance
movement. The ideology of the postwar movement was also not dissimilar to Gandhi's,
despite continuing trader accusations about the use of dysfunctional, imported ideas.
Gandhi's ethical preoccupations were missing in 1946, but the new movement rested,
like his, on a basically liberal, reformist ideology, which called for the elimination of
unjust laws. Gandhi's watchwords had been 'truth' and 'conscience'; in 1946 these
were replaced by 'equality* and 'democracy'.39
But there were also crucial differences between the two campaigns. Although the
1946 - 1948 movement sought only to mobilize Indians, the wider potential of the
ideology was never ignored. The Passive Resister, published weekly in Johannesburg
during the campaign, makes frequent references to 'Herrenvolkism' directed against
blacks and coloureds, as well as Indians. Just as frequently, readers were urged to also
read Inkuluteko, which was described as a progressive paper which advocated co-
operation between all races for a democratic South Africa. In June 1947, on the first
anniversary of the campaign, Dadoo noted that 'we have entered into a period of active
co-operation between the oppressed peoples for basic human rights'.40 The other
crucial difference between the two campaigns is that despite the potential for inter-class
solidarity implicit in the ideology of both, recruitment efforts were focussed largely on
the traders in the earlier movement, and largely on the workers in the 1940s. It is
worth noting finally, though, that the 1946 - 1948 campaign never achieved Gandhi's
belated, but nevertheless magnifirient, level of mass mobilization: an estimated 2,000
people sought arrest, just over half of whom were workers. Although my research on
the 1940s is still at an early stage, a tentative explanation for this is offered in the
conclusion.
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Hie ideologies which have shaped South African Indian politics run the gamut from
class and racial exclusivity, to inter-class and inter-race solidarity. Indians have been
politically mobilized by perceiving themselves as an elite, as workers, as Indians, as
South Africans, or as non-Europeans (to use the terminology of the time). One of the
most interesting aspects of this history is the way in which self-perceptions are capable
of change, sometimes with breathtaking rapidity. But the more things have changed,
the more they have stayed the same. New forms of consciousness, like those they re-
placed, almost invariably served the perceived interests of those who underwent the
change: ideologies were accepted, rejected, or tentatively toyed with, on the basis of
their seeming compatability with those interests.
This history also demonstrates the pivotal role of the Indian lower middle classes -
the new elite, or the white collar/petty trader eilite, as I have called them - in the process
of Indian radicalization. Both at the turn of the century, and in the 1930s and 1940s,
their realignment of loyalties away from the big traders, and towards the mass of the
people, proved to be the crucial intervention which made possible the at least partial
realization of the potential of radical ideology.
One final point is worth addressing, if somewhat tentatively: the limited success of
the 1946 - 1948 movement in achieving widespread mobilization. I would like to
suggest that this did not derive from any instrinsic limitation in the ideology (nor,
indeed, in the organizational infrastructure of the movement)4! but rather from the
programme of action which the radicals chose to adopt. It is already clear from my re-
search that the Transvaal Indian working class welcomed the escape from Johannes-
burg's over-priced slums to the Indian township which was to be established under the
provisions of the Ghetto Act.42 Thus their most pressing needs were put before any
wider, or longer term considerations of the implications of segregation (as, of course,
were the traders'). Whether these calculations were also made by Natal workers, I have
yet to explore. The fact that the passive resistance movement, despite strong links with
politically aware organized labour, and despite the manifest grievances of Indian work-
ers, mobilized only around 1,000 of the 22,000 Indian trader union members, suggests
that they might have been. From this, I would like to suggest that ideologies with a
generalized overarching appeal, which are capable of utilization by different social strata
and which, indeed, are capable of ideologically linking different strata, are nevertheless
capable of effecting widespread, sustained political mobilization only by being addressed
to the specific fundamental grievances of those strata. Both the 1906 - 1913, and the
1946 - 1948 passive resistance movements would seem to support this proposition.
oooOooo
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part of this paper are held, with the Ballinger papers, in the Church of the Province
Library, University of the Witwatersrand. The South African Institute of Race Rela-
tions collection, of which the Rheinallt Jones papers are a part, has yet to be catalogued
by the library. Boxes and files are distinguished by sometimes lengthy descriptions
which often bear little relationship to their contents. I have followed the usual order of
documentation by listing the collection first, followed by the box, file (if there was
one), and then the actual document.
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